Beyond Jobs: Why India Should Build GCC-Anchored Industrial Ecosystems

I. Beyond the GCC: Rethinking India's Next Phase of Industrial Development.

NASSCOM's annual report on India's Global Capability Centre (GCC) landscape, released on 3 July, marks an important milestone in understanding how these centres are evolving. The report says that India's GCCs are no longer simply executing global mandates but are increasingly shaping them. The report identifies four structural shifts driving this transformation: the growing responsibility of Indian GCCs in leading enterprise AI adoption; the shortening journey from operational centres to strategic hubs: the migration of enterprise authority towards India; and, perhaps most significantly, the need for GCCs to move beyond managing partners towards co-creating with them.

Taken together, these shifts reflect a profound change in the role of GCCs within multinational enterprises. As Artificial Intelligence (AI), cloud computing, digital engineering, enterprise software, and advanced analytics reshape global business, many Indian GCCs are becoming centres for innovation, product development, engineering, and strategic decision-making rather than simply delivery organisations. This represents a welcome departure from the traditional outsourcing narrative and rightly acknowledges that India's contribution to global enterprises is becoming increasingly sophisticated.

Yet the report's fourth insight also raises a larger question that extends beyond the boundaries of the multinational enterprise itself. If the future of advanced GCCs lies in co-creation rather than coordination, who should those partners be? The report understandably examines this question from the perspective of global enterprises and their business ecosystems. I approach it from a different perspective. I argue that India's industrial policy should build upon this emerging co-creation model by enabling broader industry-specific ecosystems involving GCCs, Indian companies, startups, MSMEs, colleges/universities, research institutions, data-centres, manufacturing infrastructure, and state governments. In other words, if GCCs are becoming engines of co-creation within global enterprises, India should ensure that this capability also contributes to capability formation across the wider Indian economy.

The objective is no longer simply to maximise the number of GCCs operating in India or the number of professionals they employ. It is to maximise the long-term technological value that their presence can generate throughout India's wider industrial ecosystem.

Doing so, however, requires questioning one of the most basic assumptions underpinning current policy discussions.

The problem begins with how GCCs themselves are classified.

Like "MSMEs", "startups", and even "DeepTech", GCCs are frequently discussed as though they constitute a single industry.

They do not.

Recognising this seemingly simple distinction fundamentally changes how we should think about GCCs — and, more importantly, how India can leverage them to build the next generation of industry-specific innovation ecosystems.

II. GCCs Are Not an Industry

One reason discussions about Global Capability Centres often remain confined to employment, office space, or investment is that GCCs are frequently treated as though they constitute an industry in their own right.

They do not.

A GCC is no more an industry than a startup, an MSME, or what is commonly described as "DeepTech."

This distinction may appear semantic, but it has profound implications for industrial policy.

Consider the term MSME.

It is not an industrial sector.

It is an administrative classification based primarily on the size and investment profile of an enterprise.

MSMEs manufacture automobiles, pharmaceuticals, electronics, machinery, chemicals, textiles, software, and thousands of other products and services.

The category says very little about what a firm produces.

It merely describes one characteristic of the enterprise.

The same applies to startups.

A startup is not an industry.

It is a stage in an organisation's lifecycle.

Startups operate across healthcare, agriculture, logistics, education, financial services, manufacturing, aerospace, biotechnology, retail, and numerous other sectors.

Their common feature is organisational maturity rather than industrial activity.

The increasingly popular label DeepTech presents a similar challenge.

Although widely used by investors and policymakers, DeepTech is less an industry than a broad description of ventures built around advanced scientific or engineering capabilities.

Companies working in semiconductors, robotics, quantum technologies, advanced materials, biotechnology, industrial AI, photonics, defence technologies, and space technologies are often grouped together despite participating in entirely different industrial ecosystems.

The term is useful for investment discussions.

It should not be mistaken for a coherent industrial sector.

The same reasoning applies to GCCs.

A GCC is fundamentally an organisational model through which a multinational enterprise performs engineering, technology, operations, finance, design, analytics, research, or other strategic functions from a particular location.

What the GCC actually does depends entirely upon the industry to which its parent company belongs.

An automotive GCC differs fundamentally from a banking GCC.

A pharmaceutical GCC operates under very different technological and regulatory conditions from a retail GCC.

An aerospace GCC has little in common with a consulting or software-services GCC beyond the organisational label.

Grouping all of them together risks obscuring more than it reveals.

An automotive GCC may develop embedded software, digital twins, autonomous-driving systems, and manufacturing engineering.

A pharmaceutical GCC may focus on clinical data management, regulatory analytics, digital health, and AI-assisted drug discovery.

A banking GCC may specialise in payments infrastructure, cybersecurity, fraud detection, and enterprise AI.

A retail GCC may concentrate on inventory optimisation, customer analytics, pricing systems, warehouse automation, and omnichannel commerce.

Although each is formally classified as a GCC, they participate in entirely different production systems.

This distinction matters because technological capabilities rarely diffuse through administrative categories.

They diffuse through industries.

An innovation in automotive manufacturing is unlikely to transform pharmaceutical production.

A breakthrough in financial technology does not automatically improve aerospace engineering.

Capabilities generally spread through relationships among firms, suppliers, universities, research institutions, infrastructure providers, and skilled professionals working within related industrial domains.

Once GCCs are viewed this way, an important implication follows.

Rather than designing generic "GCC policies", governments can begin thinking in terms of industry-specific GCC ecosystems.

The relevant questions are no longer:

How many GCCs does India have?

Instead, policymakers might ask:

How strong is India's automotive GCC ecosystem?

How well connected are pharmaceutical GCCs with Indian life-sciences companies?

Are electronics GCCs collaborating with domestic manufacturers and component suppliers?

Do logistics GCCs interact with Indian logistics technology firms?

Are industrial engineering GCCs contributing to broader manufacturing capability?

These questions shift attention away from counting institutions towards understanding relationships.

They also recognise that every industry possesses its own technological trajectory, supplier networks, regulatory environment, research institutions, and skill requirements.

Consequently, no single ecosystem model can apply uniformly across every GCC.

An automotive ecosystem will necessarily differ from one centred on pharmaceuticals.

A banking ecosystem will differ from one centred on electronics manufacturing.

Some ecosystems may require advanced manufacturing facilities.

Others may depend primarily upon digital infrastructure, specialised research institutions, or regulatory expertise.

Recognising these differences allows industrial policy itself to become more precise.

Rather than treating GCCs as isolated employers operating alongside the Indian economy, they can instead be viewed as one institutional component within much larger industry-specific networks involving Indian manufacturers, startups, MSMEs, universities, research institutions, infrastructure providers, and governments.

The GCC, in other words, is not the ecosystem.

It is one important participant within it.

Once this distinction is recognised, the policy discussion naturally shifts beyond attracting GCCs towards a more ambitious objective:

How can GCCs become anchor institutions around which broader industrial capabilities develop?

Answering that question requires another conceptual shift.

India has rightly focused on building capabilities for GCCs.

The next challenge is to explore how GCCs themselves can contribute to building capabilities through GCCs across the wider economy.

III. From Capability Building for GCCs to Capability Building through GCCs

India's policy towards Global Capability Centres has, understandably, focused on one primary objective: ensuring that the country can supply the specialised workforce these centres require.

This strategy has produced substantial dividends.

India's large engineering talent pool, expanding digital infrastructure, and growing network of technical institutions have made it one of the world's preferred destinations for multinational enterprises seeking engineering, analytics, cloud, and AI capabilities.

Both the Union Government and several state governments have actively encouraged GCC investment through infrastructure development, policy support, and improvements in the ease of doing business.

These efforts should continue.

Indeed, they will become even more important as GCCs undertake increasingly sophisticated work in enterprise AI, digital engineering, industrial software, cybersecurity, and cloud platforms.

However, as GCCs evolve, India's strategic thinking must evolve alongside them.

The question is no longer simply: How can India build capabilities for GCCs?

It is increasingly becoming: How can GCCs contribute to building capabilities throughout the wider Indian economy?

This distinction is fundamental.

Building capabilities for GCCs focuses on preparing talent, improving employability, aligning curricula with industry needs, and ensuring multinational enterprises can recruit the specialised professionals they require.

Building capabilities through GCCs asks a different question.

How can the engineering practices, organisational experience, technical expertise, and problem-solving capabilities developed within these centres strengthen India's broader industrial ecosystem through commercially viable partnerships?

This is not an argument for mandatory technology transfer.

Nor is it a proposal that multinational corporations should surrender proprietary algorithms, patents, software, product designs, or trade secrets.

Such expectations would be unrealistic and ultimately counter-productive.

Innovation depends upon companies being able to protect the intellectual property that gives them their competitive advantage.

The focus here is different.

It is not the diffusion of intellectual property.

It is the diffusion of capabilities.

Capabilities encompass the practical knowledge required to solve complex engineering problems, integrate technologies, manage sophisticated projects, deploy AI systems, organise production, operate digital infrastructure, and continuously improve products and processes.

Unlike intellectual property, such capabilities often spread naturally through collaboration, supplier relationships, employee mobility, university partnerships, standards development, consulting ecosystems, and participation in common industrial networks.

This distinction also helps move the discussion beyond a false choice that often characterises debates about foreign investment.

Multinational corporations need not be viewed either as organisations that must freely share their technologies or as institutions whose only contribution is employment generation.

Between these two extremes lies a much larger space for mutually beneficial capability formation.

Companies routinely collaborate with suppliers, universities, startups, engineering firms, and research institutions because doing so strengthens their own competitiveness.

Better suppliers improve product quality.

Better-trained graduates reduce recruitment costs.

Stronger research institutions generate more valuable collaborations.

More capable industrial ecosystems expand commercial opportunities.

Capability diffusion, therefore, is not an act of corporate generosity.

It is frequently sound business.

Recognising this creates an opportunity to rethink the place of GCCs within India's broader development strategy.

Rather than viewing them primarily as destinations for engineering talent, they can increasingly be understood as anchor institutions capable of strengthening wider industrial ecosystems through networks of mutually beneficial collaboration.

The challenge is no longer merely to increase the number of GCCs operating in India.

It is to create conditions under which the capabilities they develop circulate, combine with those of other institutions, and generate new forms of industrial value.

That requires moving beyond individual organisations towards a broader understanding of ecosystems themselves.

IV. Building GCC-Anchored Industrial Ecosystems

If Global Capability Centres are to contribute more meaningfully to India's long-term technological development, an obvious question follows:

How can capability diffusion actually take place?

The answer does not lie in expecting multinational corporations to operate differently from any other commercial enterprise.

Nor does it lie in compelling firms to transfer proprietary technologies, disclose confidential knowledge, or undertake activities that do not align with their commercial interests.

Instead, the answer lies in building ecosystems within which collaboration becomes commercially beneficial for every participant.

This represents a subtle but important shift in thinking.

Rather than viewing the GCC as an isolated institution operating alongside the Indian economy, it should be viewed as one participant within a much broader industrial network.

Such a network might include:

• Global Capability Centres;
• Indian manufacturing companies;
• mid-sized enterprises;
• MSMEs;
• startups;
• universities and technical institutions;
• research organisations;
• testing and certification facilities;
• specialised engineering consultancy firms;
• infrastructure providers;
• financial institutions; and
• governments acting as facilitators rather than controllers.

Each participant performs a different function.

Each possesses different capabilities.

And each benefits differently from participation.

The GCC contributes advanced engineering expertise, exposure to global technologies, sophisticated organisational practices, and access to international markets.

Indian manufacturers contribute production capability, industrial experience, supplier networks, and market understanding.

Mid-sized firms frequently provide flexibility and specialised engineering.

MSMEs contribute components, tooling, fabrication, maintenance, and industrial services.

Startups contribute experimentation, speed, and niche innovation.

Universities educate talent and undertake applied research.

Research institutions expand scientific and technological knowledge.

Infrastructure providers supply the digital and physical foundations upon which all other participants depend.

No participant replaces another.

Their strengths are complementary.

Seen this way, the ecosystem is organised not around ownership but around capability.

Its objective is not to create dependence upon any single organisation.

Its objective is to increase the collective capability of the network itself.

This perspective is especially important because innovation rarely moves directly from discovery to commercial success.

Between technological discovery and widespread adoption lies a translation layer that often receives far less policy attention than it deserves.

A promising engineering solution must usually pass through multiple stages before becoming commercially viable.

It may require:

• Pilots.
• Industrial testing.
• Validation under real operating conditions.
• System integration.
• Certification.
• Adaptation to local conditions.
• Supplier development.
• Training.
• Customer feedback.
• Commercial financing.
• Scaling.

Only after navigating these intermediate stages does an innovation become commercially sustainable.

Many countries possess excellent researchers.

Far fewer possess equally effective systems for translating research into products, services, and industrial capability.

This is precisely where industry ecosystems become valuable.

Because the relevant institutions already participate within the same network, innovations can move more efficiently between research, engineering, manufacturing, deployment, and commercialisation.

A manufacturing GCC developing AI-assisted quality inspection systems may collaborate with Indian equipment manufacturers during pilot deployment.

A logistics GCC developing supply-chain optimisation tools may work alongside domestic logistics companies operating under Indian conditions.

A healthcare GCC designing clinical AI solutions may benefit from collaboration with Indian hospitals, medical colleges, and healthcare technology firms.

An industrial engineering GCC may work with Indian manufacturers to refine production technologies before wider deployment across global markets.

These collaborations need not be one-sided.

Indeed, they are more likely to succeed precisely because every participant gains something valuable.

The multinational enterprise gains access to manufacturing partners, engineering expertise, specialised suppliers, deployment opportunities, and insights from one of the world's largest and most diverse markets.

Indian companies gain exposure to advanced engineering practices, international quality standards, systems integration capabilities, and new commercial opportunities.

Universities gain access to real industrial problems.

Students receive stronger pathways into specialised careers.

Suppliers become more technologically sophisticated.

Startups obtain opportunities to validate and commercialise innovative solutions.

The ecosystem therefore functions not as a mechanism for redistributing value.

It functions as a mechanism for creating additional value.

Importantly, such ecosystems should never be expected to look identical across industries.

An aerospace ecosystem will differ fundamentally from a pharmaceutical ecosystem.

A banking ecosystem will require institutions very different from those of an electronics manufacturing ecosystem.

A logistics ecosystem will evolve differently from one centred on industrial machinery.

This diversity is not a weakness.

It reflects the reality that technological development is ultimately industry-specific.

Each industry possesses its own production systems, technological challenges, supplier networks, regulatory environments, and innovation pathways.

Consequently, ecosystem design should reflect industrial realities rather than follow a uniform national template.

The role of government therefore changes as well.

Rather than prescribing how companies should collaborate, governments create conditions under which collaboration becomes easier, less costly, and commercially attractive.

They can:

• Facilitate industry partnerships.
• Support collaborative research.
• Strengthen testing and certification infrastructure.
• Encourage industry-academia partnerships.
• Promote supplier development.
• Improve regulatory coordination.
• Invest in shared infrastructure.

And create platforms through which ecosystem participants discover opportunities for mutually beneficial cooperation.

In this framework, governments act less as controllers of industrial activity than as conveners and facilitators.

Healthy ecosystems cannot simply be legislated into existence.

They emerge when organisations discover that working together creates greater value than working independently.

Once this perspective is adopted, another implication becomes immediately apparent.

Modern AI-intensive ecosystems require more than talent and organisational partnerships.

They also require sophisticated shared digital infrastructure.

This brings another rapidly growing institutional phenomenon into the discussion—India's expanding data-centre ecosystem.

V. Data Centres, Computational Clustering, and the Digital Foundations of GCC-Anchored Ecosystems

One of the most significant developments accompanying India's rapid expansion of Global Capability Centres has received comparatively little attention in discussions about industrial strategy.

Alongside the growth of GCCs, India is witnessing an unprecedented expansion of digital infrastructure.

Large Indian industrial conglomerates are investing in gigawatt-scale data-centre campuses across multiple states.

Global technology companies such as Google, Microsoft, and Amazon continue expanding their own Indian data-centre capacity to support cloud services, enterprise computing, Artificial Intelligence, and digital platforms.

These two developments are generally discussed independently.

One concerns talent.

The other concerns infrastructure.

Viewed strategically, however, they are deeply interconnected.

In an earlier article, I argued that India's policy for attracting GCCs should be more closely integrated with its rapidly expanding data-centre policy.

The reasoning was straightforward.

As multinational companies increasingly manage AI development, enterprise software, cloud engineering, digital platforms, and large-scale computational workloads from their Indian GCCs, access to abundant computing infrastructure becomes almost as important as access to engineering talent itself.

Integrating the two policies therefore strengthens India's attractiveness as a global GCC destination.

Companies locating advanced GCC operations in India would benefit not only from the country's engineering workforce, but also from proximity to world-class computing infrastructure, enterprise cloud platforms, AI compute capacity, and, where relevant, lower-latency digital operations.

That argument remains valid.

Viewed through the broader ecosystem perspective developed in this article, however, the significance of data centres extends considerably further.

Their importance lies not merely in supporting individual GCCs.

It lies in supporting entire ecosystems.

Increasingly, every participant within a modern technology ecosystem depends upon advanced computational infrastructure.

GCCs require AI compute, enterprise cloud platforms, cybersecurity infrastructure, software development environments, and advanced analytics.

Universities increasingly require high-performance computing for engineering education and applied research.

Startups developing AI-enabled products require scalable cloud resources long before they possess the resources to build their own infrastructure.

Indian companies depend upon cloud platforms, enterprise software, data analytics, and digital collaboration.

Research institutions require computational resources for modelling, simulation, experimentation, and scientific discovery.

Rather than every organisation investing independently in increasingly expensive computational infrastructure, commercial data centres provide a shared digital foundation upon which multiple participants can build.

Viewed this way, data centres begin to resemble traditional industrial infrastructure.

Throughout industrial history, firms clustered around ports, railway junctions, highways, reliable electricity, and logistics hubs because these reduced costs, improved connectivity, and facilitated collaboration.

The AI economy is beginning to produce an equivalent phenomenon.

Industries are increasingly clustering around abundant computational capacity.

This may be described as computational clustering.

Just as industrial clusters emerged around shared physical infrastructure, computational clusters emerge around shared digital infrastructure.

Regions possessing abundant computing capacity, reliable electricity, high-speed fibre connectivity, skilled technical talent, cloud services, cybersecurity expertise, and enterprise software capabilities become increasingly attractive locations for AI-intensive industries.

This idea also clarifies why different GCC-anchored ecosystems need not possess identical architectures.

Many industries remain overwhelmingly software-intensive.

• Enterprise software.
• Banking and financial services.
• Retail platforms.
• Consulting.
• Cybersecurity.
• Cloud services.
• Digital media.
• Enterprise AI.

For these ecosystems, the principal shared infrastructure is not manufacturing space.

It is computational infrastructure.

Data centres therefore become the primary enabling assets around which collaboration, experimentation, product development, enterprise AI deployment, and digital innovation occur.

Computational clustering performs for software-intensive industries a role analogous to that performed by industrial clusters during earlier phases of industrial development.

Other ecosystems, however, follow a different technological logic. Industries like....

• Automotive engineering
• Electronics
• Industrial machinery
• Medical devices
• Robotics
• Aerospace

....increasingly depend upon AI, simulation, digital twins, industrial software, and cloud computing.

Yet their innovations must eventually become physical products.

Consequently, these ecosystems require both computational infrastructure and manufacturing infrastructure.

This distinction is important.

Not every GCC-anchored ecosystem requires industrial parks.

But every AI-intensive ecosystem increasingly requires access to advanced computing infrastructure.

Recognising this allows ecosystem design to become considerably more nuanced.

Software-intensive ecosystems may naturally evolve around computational clusters supported by hyperscale data centres, universities, startups, digital infrastructure providers, cloud platforms, and enterprise GCCs.

Industrial technology ecosystems may combine those same digital foundations with manufacturing facilities, supplier networks, testing laboratories, engineering firms, and production clusters.

The role of government, therefore, is not to prescribe identical ecosystem architectures across every sector.

Rather, it is to ensure that complementary infrastructure policies reinforce one another.

The Union Government can continue strengthening the enabling environment for both GCC investment and data-centre expansion through national policies relating to digital infrastructure, connectivity, cybersecurity, reliable electricity, and investment facilitation.

State governments, meanwhile, can integrate data-centre development into their broader industrial strategies, ensuring that computational infrastructure complements the industries they seek to develop.

Viewed through this lens, data centres become much more than digital real estate.

They become shared industrial infrastructure for the AI economy.

Yet digital infrastructure alone cannot complete the innovation journey.

Many GCCs—particularly those operating in manufacturing-intensive industries—generate advanced engineering designs, digital models, AI-enabled simulations, and sophisticated prototypes.

Eventually, however, these innovations must move beyond the digital environment and enter physical production.

That transition requires another form of shared infrastructure.

It is here that India's proposed BHAVYA industrial parks can become an important component of manufacturing-oriented GCC ecosystems.

VI. From Digital Design to Physical Production: The Role of BHAVYA Industrial Parks

While computational clustering provides the digital foundation for many GCC-anchored ecosystems, it does not complete the innovation cycle for industries whose outputs are ultimately physical.

A product may begin its journey as a digital concept.

It may be modelled using Artificial Intelligence.

Simulated through digital twins.

Optimised using advanced engineering software.

Refined through multiple virtual iterations.

Yet, eventually, it must become something tangible—a component, a machine, a medical device, an electronic system, or a finished product capable of being manufactured reliably at commercial scale.

The transition from digital engineering to physical production is often one of the most demanding stages of industrial development.

Designing a product and manufacturing it efficiently are closely related capabilities.

They are not, however, the same capability.

Between them lies another important translation layer.

Prototypes must be fabricated.

Manufacturing processes must be tested.

Components must be sourced.

Production lines must be calibrated.

Quality standards must be validated.

Certification requirements must be satisfied.

Supply chains must be organised.

Production economics must be refined.

Only then can production move from experimental batches to commercially viable scale.

Many promising technologies fail not because the underlying engineering is weak, but because this transition from engineering to manufacturing proves difficult.

This is where India's proposed BHAVYA industrial parks can become an important component of manufacturing-oriented GCC ecosystems.

Viewed narrowly, industrial parks provide land, utilities, transport connectivity, and factory space.

Viewed through the ecosystem perspective developed in this article, however, they perform a much broader function.

They provide shared environments within which engineering, manufacturing, suppliers, startups, testing facilities, and production partners can interact more effectively.

For manufacturing-intensive GCC ecosystems, this creates entirely new possibilities.

Consider an industrial technology GCC developing AI-enabled factory automation systems.

The software architecture may be designed inside the GCC.

A startup may contribute specialised industrial sensors.

A university laboratory may assist with testing and validation.

Yet producing a commercially deployable solution requires manufacturing partners capable of producing hardware, assembling systems, integrating components, and scaling production.

An industrial park provides the physical environment within which these relationships can mature.

The same logic extends across numerous industries.

An automotive GCC developing next-generation mobility technologies may collaborate with Indian vehicle manufacturers and component suppliers.

An electronics GCC may work alongside semiconductor packaging companies, electronics manufacturers, and precision-engineering MSMEs.

A robotics GCC may partner with startups developing specialised hardware while nearby manufacturers produce mechanical assemblies and electronic components.

Medical-device ecosystems may similarly benefit from closer interaction among engineering centres, manufacturers, hospitals, testing laboratories, and specialised suppliers.

In each case, the industrial park functions less as a collection of factory buildings than as a production ecosystem.

It shortens the distance between engineering, prototyping, manufacturing, testing, certification, and commercial deployment.

This perspective also highlights an aspect that is often overlooked in discussions about GCCs.

India's own companies become indispensable participants within these ecosystems.

Large manufacturers contribute decades of production experience, established supplier networks, quality-management systems, and market access.

Mid-sized companies frequently possess the agility to adapt emerging technologies into commercially viable products.

MSMEs contribute specialised components, tooling, fabrication, maintenance, precision engineering, and industrial services.

Startups contribute experimentation, rapid problem-solving, and technological specialisation.

Each participant strengthens a different layer of the production system.

Taken together, they form capabilities that no single organisation could easily develop on its own.

Seen in this light, industrial parks become much more than locations for manufacturing investment.

They become environments in which industrial capabilities are continuously translated into commercially viable production.

At the same time, an important clarification is necessary.

Not every GCC-anchored ecosystem requires an industrial park.

As discussed in the previous section, software-intensive ecosystems may derive most of their competitive advantage from computational clustering centred on data centres, cloud platforms, enterprise software, and specialised talent.

Manufacturing-oriented ecosystems, by contrast, require an additional production layer capable of translating digital engineering into physical products.

The distinction reinforces one of the central themes of this article.

There is no universal blueprint for GCC-anchored ecosystems.

Some industries will naturally cluster around computational infrastructure.

Others will require both computational and manufacturing infrastructure.

Still others may evolve in entirely different ways as technologies and industries change.

Industrial policy should therefore avoid imposing standardised ecosystem models.

Instead, ecosystem architecture should reflect the technological characteristics of the industries concerned.

This principle also has important implications for governments.

It suggests that policy should become increasingly adaptive rather than prescriptive.

Rather than asking every state to build identical infrastructure, policymakers should ask a different question:

Which ecosystem architecture best reflects the industrial strengths of this particular region?

For some states, the answer may lie in computational clusters built around software, AI, finance, enterprise platforms, and hyperscale data centres.

For others, it may lie in combining digital infrastructure with manufacturing clusters capable of translating engineering into production.

In both cases, the objective remains the same.

To create environments within which institutions continuously reinforce one another's capabilities.

Determining which ecosystem model is appropriate for a particular state, however, requires detailed knowledge of local industries, infrastructure, institutions, and comparative advantages.

This is why the role of government now becomes central—not as a planner directing industrial activity, but as a facilitator capable of bringing diverse institutions together around shared opportunities.

It is to that question that the discussion now turns.

VII. Why State Governments Should Lead GCC-Anchored Ecosystem Formation

Before discussing the role of governments, an important clarification is necessary.

This article is not arguing that India's industrial strategy should revolve around Global Capability Centres, nor that every industrial ecosystem should be anchored by one.

India already possesses numerous successful industrial ecosystems that have evolved around large domestic enterprises.

Companies such as Tata Electronics, Maruti Suzuki, Vedanta Group, Reliance Industries, and many others have, over decades, attracted suppliers, nurtured specialised capabilities, created employment, strengthened regional economies, and built extensive production networks. Governments should continue supporting such ecosystems. They remain indispensable to India's long-term industrial development.

The argument advanced here is different.

Over the past decade, GCCs have themselves become an important institutional phenomenon within the Indian economy.

Initially valued primarily for employment generation and export earnings, many have evolved into centres responsible for enterprise AI, digital engineering, cloud platforms, industrial software, cybersecurity, product development, advanced analytics, and strategic decision-making.

This transformation presents India with a new opportunity.

Rather than viewing GCCs simply as destinations for engineering talent, policymakers can begin viewing them as potential anchor institutions around which new industry-specific ecosystems may emerge.

This is not a substitute for India's existing industrial strategy.

It is an expansion of it.

Different industries may possess different institutional anchors.

Some ecosystems naturally develop around large manufacturing enterprises.

Others emerge around research universities or scientific institutions.

Increasingly, some may evolve around technologically sophisticated GCCs.

The task of industrial policy is not to privilege one model over another.

It is to strengthen each where it is most appropriate.

This naturally raises another question.

Which level of government is best positioned to facilitate such ecosystems?

While the Union Government establishes the broader policy environment, the answer, in many cases, is likely to be the states.

The reason is straightforward.

Industrial ecosystems are fundamentally regional.

They emerge within specific geographies, drawing upon local industries, institutions, infrastructure, natural resources, supply chains, and talent.

State governments understand these regional strengths better than anyone else.

They know which industries already possess significant presence.

They understand where supplier networks are well developed and where important gaps remain.

They work closely with engineering colleges, universities, research institutions, industrial associations, and skill-development agencies.

They regularly interact with startups, MSMEs, mid-sized companies, and large enterprises.

They oversee many of the practical issues that determine industrial competitiveness—land, electricity, water, transport connectivity, local infrastructure, urban planning, and environmental clearances.

In short, they already understand the ecosystem because they operate within it every day.

This places them in a unique position.

Rather than acting merely as investment promoters, state governments can increasingly become ecosystem facilitators.

The distinction is important.

Traditionally, industrial promotion has often been measured by investment proposals secured, factories inaugurated, or employment created.

These remain valuable achievements.

But ecosystems require something more.

They require relationships.

The success of an ecosystem depends not simply upon attracting organisations, but upon strengthening interactions among them.

Can universities collaborate more closely with industry?

Can startups gain access to pilot customers?

Can MSMEs become suppliers to larger firms?

Can manufacturing companies partner with engineering centres?

Can research institutions solve applied industrial problems?

Can digital infrastructure reinforce local industrial strengths?

These are the questions ecosystem-oriented governments begin asking.

Their role is not to direct firms how to collaborate.

Healthy ecosystems cannot be created through administrative instructions.

Rather, governments can act as conveners.

They can:

• Reduce barriers to collaboration
• Strengthen shared infrastructure
• Facilitate research partnerships
• Improve regulatory coordination
• Support supplier development
• Encourage skill formation

And create environments within which organisations discover that collaboration is commercially advantageous.

Importantly, this also means that ecosystems need not look identical across India.

A state with strengths in enterprise software, financial services, and AI may naturally develop computational clusters centred upon hyperscale data centres, universities, startups, cloud providers, and enterprise GCCs.

A state with strong automotive or electronics industries may combine those same computational foundations with manufacturing clusters, engineering firms, specialised suppliers, testing laboratories, and industrial parks.

Another state may specialise in pharmaceuticals.

Another in aerospace.

Another in renewable-energy technologies.

Each ecosystem reflects the industrial realities of its region.

This flexibility is one of the greatest strengths of the ecosystem approach.

It rejects the idea of a single national template.

Instead, it encourages each state to build ecosystems consistent with its own comparative advantages while contributing to India's broader technological development.

Viewed this way, the rapid growth of GCCs represents far more than an employment opportunity.

It represents a structural transformation that has become too significant to ignore in industrial policymaking.

The challenge is no longer simply to attract more GCCs.

It is to integrate those already present into broader networks of firms, universities, infrastructure, startups, suppliers, and research institutions so that they contribute not only to the competitiveness of their parent companies, but also to the long-term technological capabilities of the regions in which they operate.

Doing so, however, raises an important question.

Would such collaboration merely reduce Indian firms to technology licencees of multinational corporations?

Answering that question requires looking beyond contemporary policy debates and examining how technologically successful economies have historically accumulated industrial capabilities.

VIII. Capability Formation, Partnerships, and the Path to Technological Leadership

One concern is likely to arise from the framework proposed in this article.

If Global Capability Centres become anchor institutions within industry-specific ecosystems, would Indian companies merely become technology licencees or implementation partners for multinational corporations?

The concern deserves careful consideration.

Every country ultimately seeks not merely to participate in technological progress but to strengthen its own technological capabilities.

Yet framing the question as a choice between foreign technology and indigenous innovation creates a false dichotomy.

As argued earlier, capability and intellectual property are not the same thing.

The diffusion of one does not require the surrender of the other.

The more important historical question is this:

How have technologically successful countries actually accumulated capability over time?

History suggests they rarely did so through isolated acts of invention.

Instead, technological leadership has generally been preceded by prolonged periods of industrial learning.

Countries accumulated engineering capability through licensing, supplier relationships, joint ventures, collaborative manufacturing, export participation, organisational learning, and continuous capability upgrading.

East Asia illustrates this process particularly well.

Taiwan's semiconductor industry, South Korea's electronics sector, and Japan's advanced manufacturing industries each followed different institutional paths.

Yet they shared one important characteristic.

Domestic companies accumulated engineering expertise gradually through participation in increasingly sophisticated production systems.

Licensed manufacturing.

Supplier development.

Collaborative engineering.

Quality improvement.

Continuous learning.

Over time, these capabilities enabled companies to move beyond adaptation towards increasingly original design, research, and technological leadership.

Capability preceded innovation.

The same principle applies more broadly across industrial development.

Participation need not imply dependence.

Industrial learning is not the opposite of technological sovereignty.

It is often the path through which technological sovereignty is gradually built.

India's own industrial history reflects a similar pattern.

Many sectors have matured through decades of technical collaborations, licensed production, supplier relationships, engineering partnerships, and joint ventures involving both Indian and international companies.

These relationships enabled Indian firms not merely to manufacture products but to strengthen engineering capability, improve production systems, expand research capacity, and undertake increasingly sophisticated technological work.

Over time, many Indian companies progressed far beyond assembling imported technologies.

They adapted. Improved. Redesigned.

And, in many cases, developed globally competitive capabilities of their own.

The ecosystem framework proposed in this article follows precisely this logic.

Its objective is not to replace indigenous innovation with multinational innovation.

Nor is it to encourage permanent technological dependence.

Rather, it seeks to strengthen the capabilities that make indigenous innovation progressively more likely.

Capability extends far beyond ownership of patents.

It includes:

• Engineering competence.
• Manufacturing expertise.
• Systems integration.
• Enterprise AI deployment.
• Industrial software development.
• Quality management.
• Supply-chain coordination.
• Project execution.
• Organisational learning.

These capabilities accumulate through participation in demanding industrial environments where firms continuously interact with customers, suppliers, universities, research institutions, engineering partners, and multinational enterprises.

This is precisely where well-designed GCC-anchored ecosystems can contribute.

A multinational enterprise develops advanced engineering methods for its own commercial purposes.

Indian firms participating within the same ecosystem strengthen their own capabilities through collaboration, production, adaptation, and problem-solving.

Universities engage with real industrial challenges.

Startups obtain opportunities to validate emerging technologies.

MSMEs upgrade manufacturing processes and quality standards.

None of these developments requires multinational corporations to surrender proprietary technologies.

Capability grows because the ecosystem itself becomes progressively more capable.

This also reflects a broader understanding of technological sovereignty.

National capability should not be measured solely by counting domestically owned patents or indigenous products.

Those remain important indicators.

But they do not tell the whole story.

A technologically capable nation is one whose firms, universities, engineers, researchers, manufacturers, and institutions possess the knowledge required to absorb, adapt, improve, integrate, and eventually create increasingly sophisticated technologies.

Technological sovereignty, in other words, is built not only through invention.

It is also built through industrial learning.

Seen from this perspective, GCC-anchored ecosystems are not alternatives to indigenous innovation.

They are potential contributors to it.

Whether these opportunities ultimately translate into globally competitive Indian enterprises depends not upon the presence of GCCs alone, but upon the capabilities that Indian institutions themselves choose to build over time.

Capability accumulation is therefore not an alternative to indigenous innovation.

It is often the pathway through which indigenous innovation becomes possible.

IX. Conclusion: Towards an Ecosystem-Based Industrial Policy

The discussion throughout this article has centred on Global Capability Centres.

Yet, ultimately, this article is not about GCCs alone.

It is about a broader way of thinking about industrial development.

For many years, industrial policy has largely been organised around specific sectors/industries. 

More recently, policy discussions have increasingly revolved around administrative or investment categories such as MSMEs, startups, DeepTech, unicorns, and GCCs.

These classifications undoubtedly serve useful policy purposes.

But they should not be mistaken for industries in themselves.

As argued earlier, startups are organisational stages.

MSMEs are enterprise-size classifications.

DeepTech is an investment-oriented technology category.

GCCs are organisational models through which multinational enterprises undertake specialised business and technological functions.

Industrial ecosystems, by contrast, are organised around technologies, production systems, and value chains.

Industries develop through relationships.

Manufacturers depend upon suppliers.

Suppliers interact with engineering firms.

Universities educate talent and undertake research.

Research institutions generate scientific knowledge.

Startups experiment with new technologies.

Infrastructure providers enable production.

Large enterprises create scale and market demand.

Governments establish the institutional environment within which these relationships mature.

It is these interactions—not isolated organisations—that ultimately determine an economy's long-term competitiveness.

This is why ecosystems matter.

An ecosystem is not merely a collection of organisations located within the same geography.

It is a network of complementary institutions whose capabilities continuously reinforce one another.

Knowledge circulates.

Talent moves.

Suppliers upgrade.

Researchers collaborate.

Digital infrastructure enables innovation.

Manufacturing strengthens engineering.

Engineering creates new opportunities for manufacturing.

The system becomes progressively more capable because its participants continuously learn from one another.

Viewed in this light, GCCs represent one more institutional anchor around which such ecosystems may develop.

Not the only one.

Not necessarily the most important one in every industry.

But an increasingly significant one.

India already possesses successful ecosystems anchored by large domestic industrial enterprises.

It possesses research ecosystems centred upon universities and scientific institutions.

As GCCs continue evolving beyond support functions into centres for enterprise AI, digital engineering, industrial software, cloud platforms, and advanced analytics, they too create opportunities for new forms of industrial collaboration.

Ignoring this transformation would mean overlooking one of the most important institutional developments currently reshaping India's technology landscape.

Recognising it, however, requires moving beyond familiar measures of success.

Employment remains important.

Export earnings remain important.

Foreign investment remains important.

But they represent only part of the value that GCCs can generate.

Their more enduring contribution may lie in strengthening relationships across India's wider technological and industrial landscape.

India's next phase of industrial development will therefore depend not simply upon attracting more investment or creating more employment—important though both objectives remain.

It will increasingly depend upon how effectively the country connects its institutions.

The countries that lead tomorrow's industries are unlikely to be those possessing only the largest companies or the greatest number of engineers.

They are more likely to be those whose firms, universities, researchers, startups, infrastructure providers, manufacturers, and governments function as interconnected systems capable of continuously generating, absorbing, adapting, and commercialising new knowledge.

India already possesses many of these ingredients.

The challenge is to connect them more effectively.

The rapid expansion of Global Capability Centres provides one important opportunity to do so—not because GCCs alone will determine India's industrial future, nor because every ecosystem should revolve around them, but because they have become an increasingly important institutional presence within the Indian economy.

The question, therefore, is no longer simply how many GCCs India can attract.

It is how intelligently India chooses to integrate them into its wider industrial strategy.

If that opportunity is recognised with sufficient vision, GCCs can become more than destinations for engineering talent.

They can become anchor institutions around which industry-specific innovation ecosystems emerge—ecosystems that strengthen Indian firms, deepen technological capabilities, encourage industrial learning, and contribute to the country's long-term economic resilience and competitiveness.

That, ultimately, is the larger opportunity before India.

Not simply to host the world's Global Capability Centres.

But to build globally competitive industrial ecosystems around them.