Mishik Sharma

India’s e-commerce sector is sending out a subtle but powerful signal. A recent CIEL HR report (released on 26 March) notes that hiring in the sector has grown by roughly 35% over the past two years, with demand for engineering roles—software developers, DevOps professionals, AI/ML specialists—rising sharply. At first glance, this looks like a routine expansion story. It is not. What we are witnessing is a capability reorientation . India’s e-commerce companies are no longer scaling primarily through warehouses, delivery fleets, and geographic reach. They are quietly rebuilding themselves as technology-intensive systems, investing in the infrastructure needed to handle a far more complex operating model. The question is: why now? The Limits of the First Wave For much of the past decade, the dominant playbook was straightforward—expand into new cities, add sellers and dark stores, subsidise deliveries, and chase Gross Merchandise Value (GMV). This model delivered scale, visibility, and ...

For decades, India's law-makers and policy-makers have treated coal primarily as a resource to be mined, transported, and burned. India has done this at scale. It sits on nearly 400 billion tonnes of proven reserves — among the largest in the world — and has built an extensive extraction and distribution system around them. But the question is no longer whether India can extract coal efficiently. It is whether it can transform coal into the foundation of a broader industrial economy. At this moment of acute energy vulnerability, the answer remains: not yet. The ongoing disruption in West Asia, including Qatar’s suspension of natural gas exports, has exposed a structural fault-line in India’s industrial system. India imports about 85% of its crude oil, about 50% of its natural gas, and about 90% of its methanol and fertilisers. These are not merely energy statistics. They are the molecular inputs of industrial production — the feedstocks for chemicals, fertilisers, fuels, and synthe...

The recent buzz in India around NVIDIA’s announcements at the GPU Technology Conference 2026 (16-19 March) has largely focused on downstream effects—data-centres, AI infrastructure, and IT services. What is striking is not what is being discussed, but what is not. There is little serious conversation about building semiconductor capability itself. This gap matters. Because for India, the semiconductor question is not just about access to compute—it is about whether the country can build the engineering, industrial, and institutional capabilities that underpin it. Moving Beyond Prestige and Towards Purpose The global semiconductor race is often framed through extremes—2nm nodes, AI accelerators, technological supremacy. But frontier manufacturing is defined by: extreme capital intensity entrenched supply chains decades of accumulated know-how Competing head-on with companies like TSMC, Samsung Electronics, and Intel is neither immediately feasible nor necessarily optimal. A prestige-dri...

Announcements at NVIDIA's GPU Technology Conference 2026 (March 16–19) made one thing clear: artificial intelligence is no longer content to sit as a digital overlay. The spotlight on edge platforms—most notably the general availability of NVIDIA IGX Thor for industrial physical AI, with its sensor fusion, functional safety, and real-time reliability—alongside Jetson Thor-powered systems from Advantech, AI-RAN integrations by T-Mobile and Nokia, and adoptions by Caterpillar and Hitachi Rail—signals that intelligence is moving directly into factories, machines, and devices. These are not incremental tools; they enable decisions at the point of action, where latency, bandwidth, and privacy make cloud impractical. In my earlier piece, I argued that India must move AI beyond the 'topping'—the surface-level copilots, chatbots, and workflow enhancers that dominate current adoption—and embed it in the 'cake' itself: the structural core of how industries operate, produce, e...

Announcements from global technology leaders at NVIDIA's annual GPU Technology Conference (March 16-19, 2026) point towards a decisive shift in the trajectory of semiconductors and artificial intelligence. Advances in energy-efficient, specialised chips are making it possible to run powerful AI models directly on machines, devices, and industrial systems. At the same time, partnerships between AI companies and industrial software companies are embedding AI across the entire lifecycle of design, engineering, and manufacturing. These developments signal something fundamental: AI is moving beyond its role as a digital productivity layer and entering the core of industrial systems. Yet, much of today's policy thinking continues to treat AI as a "topping"—an add-on to existing digital workflows, governance tools, and enterprise software. This approach delivers incremental gains, but it misses the deeper opportunity. India's real strategic advantage lies in using AI not...

On March 18, the Union Cabinet cleared BHAVYA — the Bharat Audyogik Vikas Yojna — a ₹33,660 crore scheme to develop 100 plug-and-play industrial parks across India over six years. The announcement has received well-deserved enthusiasm in the news media. India's perennial manufacturing bottleneck has never been a shortage of investment intent; it has been the pre-production friction — land acquisition delays, clearance bottlenecks, absent utility connections — that kills momentum before a single unit is produced. A scheme that promises to resolve that friction deserves genuine appreciation. But appreciation must be matched by analytical honesty. Plug-and-play industrial parks are necessary infrastructure. They are not, by themselves, a theory of industrial transformation. Whether BHAVYA becomes a genuine inflection point in India's industrial trajectory, or another well-intentioned scheme that underperforms its promise — will depend on evolving the scheme into a broader architec...